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the sutherland report:
a missed opportunity for genuine debate on
trade, globalization and reforming the wto
Joost Pauwelyn*
Proponents of high-level panels generally invoke two reasons in favor of the
exercise. First, in the face of political deadlock, a daring yet objective analysis
by high-profile experts may create momentum for reform and unlock the
political stalemate. Second, periodic review by unbiased, yet knowledgeable
outsiders may sharpen the effectiveness of an organization and move it beyond the short-term perspective of those engrained in the system. Although
only time can tell, the odds that the Sutherland report will meet either of
these objectives are low. The report is neither experts rocking the politically
stuck boat,1 nor outsiders blowing new life into the WTO.
Although the Sutherland report offers a truly thoughtful and interesting
analysis, it is largely a defense of the status quo by WTO insiders.2 The report
nibbles around the edges of the WTO’s foundational problems – such as the
discontents of globalization, the lack of coherence between liberalization and
the provision of public goods and the imbalance between the WTO’s automatic judiciary and its deadlocked political branch – only to fixate, eventually,
on typically insider concerns and solutions (such as regional trade agreements, observership status in WTO meetings, increasing the role and budget
of the WTO Secretariat and the creation of a senior officials’ consultative
body to smooth the WTO political process and an expert group reviewing
specific dispute findings to rein-in the WTO’s judicial branch). The overall
message of the report is an unabated defense of the WTO largely unchanged3
and, for the most part, to be kept safely secluded from other international
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1

Although the WTO Director General, in a Foreword to the report (at p 2), sets out the ambitious mission of examining ‘the functioning of the institution – the WTO – and to consider how well equipped
it is to carry the weight of future responsibilities and demands’, in his Preface, Peter Sutherland (at
p 5) quickly tempered those high hopes when stating that the Consultative Board ‘tried to propose
realizable reforms rather than more substantial changes that could not, in our view, have commanded
the degree of support necessary for them to be effected’.

2

All eight members of the Consultative Board come from within the relatively closed circle of trade and
international economics: four academics, three (trade) diplomats and one businessperson. The Board
did not include any representative from civil society nor any known critic of the system.

3

An important exception is the report’s call for more transparency and public meetings including those
in WTO dispute settlement (see Chapters V and VI). Yet, this is hardly a novel call but one that has
been made and spearheaded in particular by the United States for quite some time.
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efforts to correct market failures and accompany free trade with social and
other non-economic safety nets. 4
In sum, considering the problems analyzed (insiders analyzing insider problems), the solutions proposed (insiders largely defending the status quo) and
the secluded way in which the report was produced (no external
consultation5), the Sutherland report seems destined to be regarded by history
as a missed opportunity. The report’s eloquent defense of multilateral trade
liberalization will, at best, embolden those that already supported the WTO
(which includes the present author). At worst, the report risks further alienating the critics of the world trade system and globalization more generally with
statements such as ‘the advantages that the WTO can endow on chronically
poor countries is limited’ (p 17) and ‘the creation and interpretation of WTO
rules should be preserved from undue external interference’ (p 79).
This article first addresses two specific foundational problems skirted in the
Sutherland report: (i) the WTO’s protectionist/producer bias and (ii) the
question of coordination and coherence with other international organizations (Sections I and II). The article then offers an alternative diagnosis of the
world trade system (Section III) and suggests a novel paradigm to assess
WTO reform proposals (Section IV). Finally, some of the proposals in the
Sutherland report are examined in light of this novel paradigm (Section V).

i. the dark side of the wto: inherent protectionism
and producer rather than consumer ⁄citizen welfare
The Sutherland report follows the, by now, familiar template of the defenders
of globalization (to which, I might add, the present author belongs). In
essence, liberalized trade increases economic efficiency. Although it creates
some losers, eventually, the rising tide lifts all boats and overall welfare is
increased. Yet, in apparently seamless fashion, as happens so often, the report
then equates the WTO with liberal trade. The reality, however, is that the

4

The report calls for more coherence and coordination with other intergovernmental organizations
(see Chapter IV) but essentially limits such call to the World Bank and IMF, and even there portrays
the WTO as the controlling and prevailing legal regime. See, for example, at p 38: ‘conditionalities
imposed by the IMF and World Bank should not only be supportive but consistent with WTO obligations – since they are not excluded from challenge under the Dispute Settlement Understanding’.
That the national implementation of such conditionalities can be challenged before a WTO panel is
correct. However, if one takes coordination and coherence between the WTO and the IMF/World
Bank seriously, one cannot simply require that WTO rules always and in each case prevail over such
conditionalities.

5

The Consultative Body met a total of three times without any external consultation and completed its
work in eighteen months. Contrast this to the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change that issued its report in December 2004 after 40 regional consultations and issue workshops
and six additional meetings (entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, available at http://
www.un.org/secureworld). Notwithstanding this extensive outreach, the UN report was completed in
just one year and includes ambitious proposals on reforming the UN Security Council and the rules
on the use of force.
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WTO is as much about protectionism as it is about free trade. As one commentator observed:
Global economic rules are not written by Platonic rulers, or their present-day
pretenders, academic economists. If WTO agreements were truly about ‘free
trade,’ as their opponents like to point out, a single sentence would suffice
(‘there shall be free trade’).6

For historical reasons, many of which the developing world itself is to
blame for, the system is seriously skewed in favor of the rich and powerful.
Whenever developing countries have a chance of winning the free trade game,
the sector was either carved out (textiles, agriculture) or so-called fair trade
remedies (anti-dumping, safeguards) were ushered in.
Moreover, rather than focused on consumer or citizen welfare, the trade
system is heavily tilted in favor of producers and exporters. The very premise
of the institution is to bring producer-exporters together internationally so as
to avoid the protectionist tendencies of the masses at home. The underlying
assumption is, in other words, that producers or companies always act in the
majority interest (i.e. eventually increase consumer welfare and hence can be
trusted) whilst democratic politics necessarily ends up in log-rolling and protectionism (i.e. harms overall welfare and hence must be tied to the mast of
WTO disciplines).
Yet again, the reality is, however, that there is as much politics at the WTO,
with special interest groups clamoring for favors, as there is in domestic parliaments. Protectionist agreements such as those concerning agriculture, textiles, or anti-dumping, and agreements that favor one group of countries over
another (such as TRIPS7), illustrate that the WTO does not necessarily lead
to free trade in favor of the majority, but represents a political deal brokered
in the context of power and special interests. This is not inherently a bad
thing as politics, both at the domestic and international level, will and must
always play a predominant role. However, to limit this political bargaining
game at the WTO to producer interests – on the ground that they are a proxy
of majority welfare8 and democratic politics unavoidably ends up in protectionism – is effectively elevating one set of special interests above all others.9
Equally, to isolate the WTO from non-trade concerns puts one societal
6

Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9129,
2002) at 18.

7

See, Laurence Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, 29 Yale J. Int’l l (2004) 1.

8

See John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, ‘World Trade Constitution’, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
(2000) 511.

9

See Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization’, 98 Mich L. Rev. 167 (1999) and
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, ‘The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of
Democratic Legitimacy’, in Roger B. Porter et al. (eds), Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (2001) 10.
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concern (economic welfare) above all others (e.g. citizen concerns over poverty, social welfare or the environment).
To this date, the world trade system remains focused primarily on nondiscrimination (not economic efficiency) and the protection of producer (not
consumer) welfare.10 No matter how inefficient a regulation or trade policy is
(i.e. irrespective of consumer welfare) GATT permits it as long as it is (inefficiently) applied across the board to everyone (including foreign traders).
From this perspective, the system neither avoids harmful cross-border externalities nor does it inherently protect domestic consumers. Both in the rules
and exceptions that it sets up (equal competitive opportunities, rather than
efficient regulation; major carve-outs for textiles and agriculture) and the
escape clauses it provides for (anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards triggered each time by injury to domestic producers, not harm to consumers), the system was created and continues to operate at the behest of
producers. It is wed as much to liberal trade as protecting existing producers.
In addition, it is no longer obvious that gains from trade necessarily translate into lower prices for consumers and more or better employment.11 Oftentimes the benefits of market access stick predominantly to the hands of
producers, shareholders and traders with limited trickle down effect for consumers (in terms of lower prices) or workers (in terms of higher wages or better social benefits12). In this context, to equate producer gains with majority
welfare interests can become strenuous. As the IMF’s Managing Director,
Horst Kohler, conceded, ‘the disparities between the world’s richest and
poorest nations are wider than ever’.13 Also within countries that have overall
benefited tremendously from globalization, such as the United States and
China, market forces alone have only widened the gap between rich and poor.
Indeed, even to the extent that liberalized trade does reduce consumer
prices, consumers are increasingly not just concerned or interested in lower
prices but also operate and make market decisions as citizens and workers.14
And in our capacity of citizens and workers we also desire social goods, be it

10

See Patrick Messerlin, ‘Non-Discrimination, Welfare Balances and WTO Rules: A Historical Perspective’, and Petros Mavroidis, ‘Come Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare and WTO
Rules’, in E.-U. Petersmann (ed), Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the Legitimacy
and Efficiency of the World Trading System (2003) respectively at 154 and 137.

11

See, for example, William Lakin, ‘EU Textile Quotas Benefit Consumers’, Financial Times, 4 March
2005 (providing figures that indicate that dropping quotas on textiles actually increased consumer
prices).

12

See Robert Reich, ‘Don’t Blame Wal-Mart’, New York Times, 28 February 2005 (in the United
States, in 2004, ‘the real wages of hourly workers, who make up about 80 percent of the work force,
actually dropped for the first time in more than a decade; hourly workers’ health and pension benefits are in free fall’).

13

Working for a Better Globalization, Remarks by Horst Kohler at the Conference on Humanizing the
Global Economy, Washington DC, 28 January 2002.

14

See Douglas Kysar, ‘Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation
of Consumer Choice Preferences for Processes’, 118 Harvard Law Review (2004) 525.
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the absence of abject poverty, a healthy environment or adequate health benefits and labor standards. Liberalized market forces cannot adequately ensure
the provision of those social public goods. It requires government intervention.15 Yet, is it not ironic that in an age of continuous economic expansion,
social safety nets are gradually eroding (rather than expanding) and governments find it increasingly difficult to provide those public goods? Is John
Ruggie right when he says that
global market integration induces governments to pursue greater fiscal austerity, ease regulatory and tax burdens on business, and strongly discourage certain policy options if not ruling them out altogether – owing to the relative
increase in capital mobility if nothing else.16

If so, the main collective action problem of our age is no longer to garner diffuse consumer interests in producer-run international trade rounds to combat
the protectionist excesses of democratic politics (as important as it was in the
1940s and remains today), but rather to have governments selectively exit the
downward spiral of global competition and actively coordinate on the provision of public goods. In Ruggie’s words, with post-war embedded liberalism
gone, the monumental task of this century is ‘embedding the global market
within shared social values and institutional practices’.17
In sum, the WTO system is inherently protectionist and producer-driven,
not consumer/citizen-focused. In order to make the system more acceptable
and legitimate across broad sections of society – not just traders and producers – this must be changed. Those are foundational problems of the system
that, over time, will need to be corrected. Technical assistance for developing
countries on how to negotiate trade deals and outreach by the WTO Secretariat to NGOs, the focus in the Sutherland report, will not resolve these issues.
It will require a paradigm shift both in the mechanics and substantive rules of
the institution.

ii. coordination and coherence with other
intergovernmental organizations: a step backwards?
Although the Sutherland report ‘takes a favourable view of “horizontal coordination”’ between the WTO and other intergovernmental organizations (at

15

As Robert Reich, above note 12, puts it: ‘The fact is, today’s economy offers us a Faustian bargain: it
can give consumers deals largely because it hammers workers and communities. We can blame big
corporations, but we’re mostly making this bargain with ourselves . . . The problem is, the choices we
make in the market don’t fully reflect our values as workers or citizens . . . The only way for the workers or citizens in us to trump the consumers in us is through laws and regulations that make our purchases a social choice as well as a personal one’.

16

John Ruggie, ‘Taking Embedded Liberalism Global, The Corporate Connection’, in David Held
and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (2003).

17

Id.
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p 39), it eventually concludes that ‘[t]he WTO legal system...cannot be
changed from the outside by other international organizations’ (at p 39) and
must be ‘preserved from undue external interference’ (at p 79).18 Whilst the
Consultative Board sees the need for international rules to avoid or treat market failure (at p 34), as befits WTO insiders, the report somehow assumes
that those rules must come from within the WTO, otherwise – if they stem
from, for example, the UN or the ILO – they cannot impact WTO rights and
obligations.19
This isolationist approach, setting up the WTO as a self-contained legal
island, obviously ignores that WTO Members themselves do not live on a
trade-only island and, as one and the same legal person (e.g. the United States
of America), do conclude rules on non-trade concerns outside the WTO,
including rules aimed at building stable markets (e.g. human rights conventions) and correcting environmental or social market failures. If the WTO is
serious about coherence and coordination it must take account of this other
activity and construe its own rules accordingly.20 Failing to do so will only
increase the legitimacy crisis of the WTO. It is disingenuous to talk of coordination and coherence when in fact one says upfront, as the Sutherland report
does, that, within the WTO, WTO rules always prevail over other agreements.
The WTO insiders’ view thus defended by the Consultative Board could
not be further removed from the holistic ‘human security’ approach that pervades the recent UN High-level Panel Report focused on collective security,
in particular ‘the indivisibility of security, economic development and human
freedom’.21 In a Foreword to this UN High-level report, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan summarized this genuine coordination approach as
follows:
I wholly endorse the report’s core argument that what is needed is a comprehensive system of collective security: one that tackles both new and old threats, and
addresses the security concerns of all States – rich and poor, weak and strong.
Particularly important is the report’s insistence that today’s threats to our security are all interconnected. We can no longer afford to see problems such as terrorism, or civil wars, or extreme poverty, in isolation. Our strategies must be
18

See above note 4. When it comes to WTO dispute settlement and the role there for other international rules, the report (at p 39) concludes that the system ‘offers no legal space for cooperation with
other international organizations except on a case-by-case basis derived from the right of panels to
seek information’.

19

At p 39: ‘The WTO legal system is part of the international legal system, but it is a lex specialis. This
lex specialis, qua lex specialis cannot be changed from the outside by other international organizations
that have different membership and different rules regarding the creation of rules’. This statement is
in direct contradiction with Articles 30 and 48 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
addressing, respectively, the interaction between earlier and later treaties and inter se modifications of
multilateral treaties.

20

See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, How WTO Law Relates to Other
Rules of International Law (2003).

21

See above note 5 at p 1.
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comprehensive. Our institutions must overcome their narrow preoccupations
and learn to work across the whole range of issues, in a concerted fashion.

As much as the European Communities evolved from a system built almost
exclusively on economic integration to a comprehensive regime with counterbalancing rules on the environment, social life and human rights, equally, the
WTO’s view of the world must and is expanding beyond merely liberalized
trade. The inescapable reality is that, in a globalized economy, non-trade
concerns simply cannot be separated from trade concerns. Having already
restricted the ability of states to use non-trade interests as a justification for
government policies that affect trade, the WTO can hardly wash its hands of
the problem and walk away. Existing WTO rules impact these non-trade
issues (be it efforts to protect subsistence farmers in Africa, combat climate
change or save endangered sea-turtle). The WTO must participate in the
messy political debate on their relationship.
Obviously, the differences between the EU and the WTO are and will
always remain enormous. The economic and non-economic integration at
the international level will never be as deep as that in the EU. Moreover,
whilst the EU gradually assembled legislative capacity in many noneconomic fields (such as the environment or food safety), at the international
level, a functional division of labor between international organizations, based
on state consent, is and remains desirable. Yet, the general trend of social
rules supplementing what was originally a purely economic operation is the
same: Although the WTO is legislatively concerned only with making traderelated treaties, and the UN and ILO are better equipped to focus, for
example, on security, human rights and labor questions, each of these organizations operate, and must be seen as operating, on one and the same
interconnected, though widely diverse and multi-layered, scene of international law.22
In sum, the Sutherland report merely pays lips service to the problem of
coordination and coherence. In substance, it sticks to the traditional, insiders’
view of WTO isolation. This foundational problem will not be resolved by
observership for other organizations at WTO meetings or amicus curiae briefs
by NGOs in WTO dispute settlement, the focal points in the Sutherland
Report. Like the WTO’s protectionist/producer bias, the foundational problem of coherence and coordination requires a paradigm shift both in the
mechanics and substantive rules of the institution. Indeed, compared to
Appellate Body case law on the question,23 the Sutherland Report is a step
backwards.

22

See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of InterConnected Islands’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903 (2004).

23

See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, 95
American Journal of International Law (2001) 535–78.
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iii. an alternative diagnosis of the world trade system:
the threat of a fortress wto
A superficial reading of the Sutherland Report may well lead many people to
think that, besides some transparency issues, all is going perfectly well at the
WTO and that the WTO’s biggest threat is regional trade agreements.24 Let
there be no mistake: Things are far from perfect in the world of trade. Gone
are the days of a cozy GATT-club. Instead, the threat of a WTO fortress is
looming, both for those outside and those inside the system.
Many countries and people, in particular the poor and vulnerable, feel left
behind or locked outside the WTO. For most developing countries, participation in the system remains elusive.25 Ordinary citizens in both poor and rich
countries perceive the WTO as a fortress hard to penetrate, a system that
operates, behind closed doors, in the interest of powerful producers and
exporters, but is oblivious of the rural poor and the plight of workers or the
environment.26 In this sense, the WTO suffers, first and foremost, from a lack
of popular support, loyalty or input legitimacy.
Yet, at the same time, unlike the early years of GATT, this lack of input
legitimacy is no longer offset by progress in actual trade liberalization or output legitimacy. The increase in participation or politics that did take place
over the years, in particular the insistence by WTO Members on a political
veto in decision-making, is currently stifling further welfare enhancing liberalization and preventing much needed reforms to make the system more equitable for developing countries and more open and supported by civil society.
The deadlock in the political branch, combined with an automatic dispute
process, also risks giving too much power to what many see as un-elected,
faceless bureaucrats on the judicial branch.27 As a result, the WTO is perceived as a fortress even by those inside, that is, governments and domestic
polities, tied up in the straitjacket of the WTO single package, with no way
out, or forward, either because of economic realities or because of the consensus rule and an ever stricter enforcement mechanism.
In sum, the WTO now lives in what one could call the worst of both
worlds: It misses the benefits of popular support or politics (lack of input

24

Although economists remain divided on the question of free trade deals and such deals will, for political reasons, always be around no matter what the WTO does (if only to push the conclusion of a
multilateral deal or as a much preferred alternative to war), the Consultative Board opens its report
with the issue (Chapter 1) and depicts it as the major threat to the WTO system.

25

See, for example, Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight
Against Poverty 5 (2002) (‘The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the
needs and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of the rich’).

26

See Lori Wallach, ‘The FP Interview: Lori’s War’, Foreign Pol’y (Spring 2000) 118 and K. Danaher
and R. Burbach (eds), Globalize This! The Battle Against the WTO and Corporate Rule (2000).

27

Claude Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization
1 (2001).
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legitimacy) and must do without the benefits of further trade liberalization
and a rule of law perceived as fair and equitable for everyone (lack of output
legitimacy).

iv. an alternative framework for wto reform: the
law-AND-politics paradigm
As most commentators do, the Sutherland report addresses the challenges of
the WTO in a bifurcated way, separating its analysis of the WTO’s political
branch from that of the WTO’s legal-normative structure and dispute settlement. This dichotomy between politics and law is engrained in all historical
narratives of the world trade system. The common wisdom is, indeed, that
the world trade system evolved from a power-based (politics) to a rules-based
(law) regime.28 In a steady, uni-directional process of legalization, the argument goes, trade law has gradually replaced trade politics.29
Both historically and normatively, however, this from-politics-to-law
approach is questionable. In a forthcoming article I offer an alternative
law-and-politics paradigm, demonstrating that, throughout the trade system’s evolution, law did not replace politics.30 Rather, both the levels of
law (e.g. a strengthened DSU) and politics (e.g. broader participation and
contestation and a vehement defense of the consensus rule) gradually
increased, in a mutually reinforcing fashion. Similar to the inverse relation
between Hirschman’s notions of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’31 – where closure of exit
options or stricter legal discipline increases the demand for voice or participation in the political process32 – more law in the GATT/WTO required more
politics. In particular, faced with less exit options from the system’s normative
structure, WTO Members insisted on more participation and a veto in the
system’s decision-making process. Conversely, more politics in the GATT/
WTO (e.g. the consensus rule) enabled and was an absolute precondition to
make more law (e.g. a strong DSU) acceptable and digestible.
A crucial insight of this claim is that the often referred to ‘institutional paradox’ between the WTO’s consensus-based, inefficient rule-making procedures and its highly efficient, automatic dispute settlement system is readily
28

See John Jackson, ‘The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System’, 12 J. World Trade L.
93, 99 (1978) and Robert Hudec, ‘Review Article: ‘Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The
Future of the WTO’, 1 World Trade Rev. 211, 219–20 (2002) (‘The conventional history of GATT/
WTO dispute settlement (for which I may be partly responsible) teaches that GATT dispute settlement evolved from a “diplomatic” instrument into a “judicial” instrument’).

29

See, e.g., Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’, 54 International Organization 385, at 389 (referring to a victory for trade ‘legalists’ over trade ‘pragmatists’).

30

Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2005).

31

Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970).

32

See J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991), reprinted and
updated in J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999), 10–101.
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explained.33 Rather than a paradox or puzzle, the juxtaposition of a strong,
automatic dispute settlement system (high discipline, low exit) and a tedious,
consensus-based rule-making process (high voice/participation) is a logical –
though not necessarily optimal – phenomenon. High levels of legalization and
discipline, such as a strong enforcement mechanism entail limited exit
options and naturally require and lead to high demands for voice via participation and political input, such as consensus decision-making. Put differently,
without the consensus rule in the political process the strong and automatic
DSU would not have come about and could not be sustained. Conversely,
because of a compulsory and automatic DSU, WTO Members explicitly confirmed, and continue to vehemently defend, their veto right in the political
WTO process.
Notwithstanding this intimate, bi-directional interaction between the trade
system’s legal structure and its political mechanism, conventional proposals
to reform the WTO, including the Sutherland report, do not take account of
this delicate balance between law and politics. They focus rather on one side
of the spectrum (e.g. getting rid of the consensus rule34 or reverting to
GATT-type dispute vetoes35) without weighing the counterveiling effects on
the other. Yet, the law-and-politics, exit-and-voice balance is in constant flux
and under constant threat. A minute alteration on one side can change the
balance the way pulling out one brick at one end of a building can cause
major cracks on the other end, even the demise of the entire construction. A
better framework for reform realizes the fluid equilibrium between law and
politics, discipline and participation and the bi-directional relationship that
brings it about.
Knowing that the present combination is one of high discipline (e.g. a
strong and automatic DSU and single package approach) that led to and
requires high levels of participation (including a strict consensus rule), further
legalization (i.e. further closure of exit),36 without the necessary political support, would put even more pressure on the voice mechanism and demand
even higher levels of participation in an organization where such levels are
already too low. It would only worsen the deadlock in the political branch
(less exit requires more voice, hence makes political decisions even more
33

Ignacio Garcia Bercero, ‘Functioning of the WTO System: Elements for Possible Institutional
Reform’, 6 International Trade Law and Regulation 103, 105 (2000) and Barfield, above note
27, at 1.

34

See, e.g., Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita, ‘The Balance of Power in WTO Decision-Making:
Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative Response’, 59(2) Aussenwirtschaft 171, 184–86 (2003).

35

See Barfield, above note 27, at 7.

36

See, for example, E.-U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law (1991); John Ragosta, ‘Unmasking the WTO – Access to the DSB System: Can
the DSB Live Up to Its Moniker “World Trade Court”?’, 31 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 739 (2000) (calling
for private party access to the DSU) and Raj Bhala, ‘The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare
Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy)’, 33 George Washington Int’l L. Rev. 873
(2001) (advocating a de jure rule of precedent under the DSU).
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difficult) and risk being counterproductive by putting pressure on some members, in particular the most powerful ones, to leave the organization. Equally,
although majority-based voting in the WTO37 could facilitate the decisionmaking process and thus, like further legalization, boost the WTO’s shortterm output legitimacy, the limitation in voice and participation that it would
engender (through members losing their veto over new rules) risks undermining the support for, and legitimacy of, the strong dispute process and, in the
long run, the trade system as a whole. In the absence of a high enough level of
loyalty or support for the WTO, more – not less – voice or participation from
individual WTO Members and their constituencies is needed. Finally, reverting to GATT, diplomatic-style dispute settlement, re-injecting politics into
the dispute process itself,38 may entangle decision-making deadlocks. Less
discipline would, indeed, require less participation. Yet, this proposal neglects
almost 100 years of trade history. If the inter-war period and GATT has
taught us one lesson it is that for actual trade liberalization to occur, trade
commitments must have legal value and be backed by a strong, independent
dispute mechanism. This is all the more necessary today where most trade
restrictions take the form of covert non-tariff barriers, often going to the heart
of state sovereignty, for which countries would be hard-pressed to exercise a
veto if they had one.
Although the Sutherland report does not fall in any of the above three
traps – it does not call for major, additional legalization/constitutionalization,
defends the consensus rule and rejects the proposal to revert to GATT-like
vetoes – by largely preserving the status quo it essentially ignores the problem
of the WTO’s lack of input and output legitimacy and the related problem of
asymmetry between the WTO’s judicial and political branches.
In my view, and through the lens of exit-and-voice, law-and-politics, the
trade system’s legitimacy problem is best resolved through a concerted and
balanced reform on both the law and politics side. In essence, the WTO
needs more, not less, politics and participation of individual members and
non-state actors; and more, not less, control by domestic politics and consideration of non-trade concerns (that is, more voice or politics to sustain and enable the closure of exit or increase in WTO discipline). Moreover, the WTO must
maintain, not eliminate, the possibility for exit or safety valves especially
when supported by consumer welfare or democratic decision (that is, keep
and clarify crucial exit options to enable political deals and soften the demand for
voice).
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Rather than decreasing politics and participation – as some have suggested,
for example, by getting rid of the WTO consensus rule or de-politicizing
WTO affairs – I suggest broadening the space for political debate and contestation. For the world trade system to be legitimate and sustainable, especially
with a strong normative structure, more (not less) politics are needed.39 In
large part because of its foundational mechanics (to overcome protectionism
by insulating export-interests from domestic politics), the world trade system
remains too technocratic and too isolated from popular support. To increase
participation and support, the consensus rule must be maintained but the
participation of individual WTO Members as well as non-state actors
increased. The role consensus plays in the internal and external legitimacy of
the world trade system largely compensates for the delay and lourdeur in
WTO decision-making, as well as for the sometimes limited outcome in trade
negotiations.
At the same time, to facilitate this messy voice mechanism – in particular,
consensus building and the varied avenues for input from non-state actors –
and to prevent deadlock in the political, decision-making process, it is important to keep certain exit options open and not to over-legalize the system. With
the assurance of exit in the worst-case scenario, WTO members will more
easily join a political consensus to create new rules. Crucially, limited exit
options and slightly lower levels of discipline may offer important democratic
safety valves and thereby respond to criticisms of a WTO constitution-type
construct that imposes free trade over and above anything else. In large part
because of its foundational mechanics (to overcome protectionism by insulating export-interests from domestic politics), the world trade system risks
being too rigid or legalized to respond to valid flexibility demands of representative politics.
Limited exit options, when combined with the suggested high levels of
participation, would eventually not often be resorted to: Given the high
levels of participation in law-making and the other pressures felt through
the voice mechanism (in particular from consumers and businesses that
are harmed by trade restrictions), countries ought only exercise these exit
options in exceptional circumstances. In the end, therefore, rather than
undermine the normative structure of the WTO, limited exit or somewhat
lower levels of discipline – in tandem with higher levels of participation
and politics – is the best recipe for an effective and legitimate world trade
system.
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See David Kennedy, ‘The Forgotten Politics of International Governance’, Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
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v. an assessment of some of the sutherland report
proposals under the law-AND-politics paradigm
A. The need for more voice or politics
Although the Sutherland Report at times questions the consensus decisionmaking rule and comes close to breaking it with the proposal for a 30-member
senior level consultative body,40 the report ultimately supports continuation
of the consensus principle. Under the law-and-politics paradigm, this proposal makes a lot of sense. In the absence of a high enough level of loyalty or
support for the WTO, more – not less – voice or participation from individual
WTO Members and their constituencies is needed. Indeed, it would not be
unfair to say that at this moment most layers of society have serious doubts as
to the WTO project, be it because they feel left behind, such as developing
countries, or because they perceive the WTO as a front for big business and
dehumanizing capitalist values. As a result, as the WTO stands today, not
enough loyalty exists to either replace voice or to keep exit at bay. In this
context, without drastically reducing current levels of discipline or law and
thereby weakening the system’s normative structure and effectiveness, it is
hard to imagine that any WTO Member could accept being outvoted based
on some majority-voting rule. Whatever other forms may exist to legitimize
international governance,41 in the WTO none is currently strong enough to
support the revolutionary shift from consensus to majority-based decisionmaking without seriously undermining the trade system’s effectiveness,
including its strong dispute process.
Other, more specific, proposals in the Sutherland report would also meet
the need for political reinforcement and increased levels of contestation at the
WTO, namely: more active participation of senior policy-makers in Genevabased discussions (through annual instead of bi-annual Ministerial Conferences and a summit of world leaders at the WTO every five years),42 obliging
countries that plan to block a broad consensus to explain in writing why the
matter is one of vital interest to them (thereby putting contestable decisions
on the table for substantive discussion instead of silencing debate a priori)43
and more outreach by the WTO Secretariat to civil society. 44
In contrast, other proposals in the Sutherland report risk silencing the political debate or prematurely taking away decision-making powers from WTO
40
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member states. Although the report is correct that the WTO Secretariat needs
to take a more proactive stance in explaining the benefits of liberalized trade
and connecting with civil society, it is too early – i.e. there is not yet the
required degree of loyalty or socialization of the WTO project amongst
the populations of WTO Members – to confer ‘a parallel responsibility’ on the
WTO Secretariat ‘as guardian of the system’ or ‘Guardian of the Treaties . . . to
act in the common interests of the Members’.45 Put differently, and there is no
doubt that this is the analogy that the Consultative Board had in mind, it would
be premature to convert the intergovernmental WTO Secretariat into a supranational EU-Commission type construct with independent powers and heavy
handed steering by a Jacques Delors type WTO Director-General. 46
Finally, unlike the impression created by the Sutherland report – which
focuses on observership in WTO meeetings, amicus curiae and WTOorganized seminars – increased voice or participation by non-state actors,
such as NGOs, small businesses, the rural poor and citizens at large, ought
not focus so much on having a seat or microphone in WTO meetings,47 nor
does it require any explicit approval by WTO Members. Given that the WTO
matters and is for real (exit from it has been significantly reduced), state and
non-state actors alike are using the voice mechanism and injecting politics in
the debates, whether the WTO as an organization or its individual members
like it or not. In fact, rather than NGOs and citizens needing the help or
blessing of the WTO (e.g. through formal permission to attend WTO meetings), it is the WTO that needs the input and support of NGOs and citizens
to implement and legitimize its activities.48 Crucially, the sounding board of
NGOs is not limited to, or even most important in, Geneva. Although NGOs
have an important lobbying and information role to play at the WTO itself
(adding social and expert legitimacy to the organization), their activity is even
more crucial at the grass-roots level. They constitute a direct, transnational
interface or voice mechanism where citizens and consumers can transmit concerns and obtain information about WTO activities and decisions. To enable
and foster these diverse forms of participation, contestation and dissemination, the WTO itself must – as the Sutherland report acknowledges – improve
the transparency of its activities, including its dispute settlement process. To
bring the WTO closer to the public, the creation of regional WTO offices
45
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must be considered. In addition, thought could be given to setting up a WTO
inspection mechanism similar to that available in the World Bank and
regional development banks.49
B. The need to keep exit options open
Various proposals in the Sutherland report realize the importance of keeping
exit options from the WTO open. The report somewhat reluctantly accepts
the need for a multiple-speed or variable geometry WTO.50 The WTO
should, indeed, relinquish its obsession with the single package idea. Given
the huge diversity among WTO Members, both in terms of economic development and non-economic preferences, WTO agreements and rules ought
not always be binding on all WTO Members. With close to 150 members,
differentiation or a multiple-speed WTO is unavoidable. Rather than force
new commitments on unwilling countries through majority voting or block
the entire process by insisting on consensus amongst all players, the system
must recognize its diversity and tailor-make its rules to its different constituencies. As the Sutherland report points out (at p 65), the need for consensus
amongst all WTO Members to add a plurilateral agreement to the WTO
treaty, even if such agreement is binding only on some WTO Members, must
be revisited. Even within the EU, with its far more homogeneous membership, this strict requirement for differentiation no longer applies.51 Although
some control by the entire WTO membership over new agreements is useful
(e.g. to make sure that plurilateral agreements do not harm the rights of third
parties), a single member ought not have a veto to block further WTO
progress by others.
On other occasions, however, the Sutherland report neglects the importance of exit options and seems to aim at a one-size-fits-all WTO straitjacket.
In contrast to its openness to a multiple speed WTO, the report – somewhat
contradictory – is vehemently opposed to regional trade deals and, as pointed
out earlier, refuses to give substantive weight to agreements concluded by
WTO Members themselves outside the confines of the WTO institution.
The Consultative Board also advocates a strong, legalist position on the
binding nature of WTO dispute settlement reports and expresses major reservations about the alternative WTO remedy of compensation.52 Although
technically speaking this author agrees that dispute settlement reports are
legally binding under international law, the Sutherland report thereby risks
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overlooking why remedies in the WTO are relatively weak and downplays the
usefulness, both political and economic, of alternatives to immediate, full
compliance in each and every case.
Indeed, my claim is that weak remedies in the WTO were a crucial precondition for the otherwise strengthened WTO dispute process. Knowing that
they could no longer block dispute rulings, WTO Members were eager to limit
the remedies or sanctions that would follow any WTO condemnation. To drastically reduce or eliminate those exit options – that is, to further legalize the
WTO without countervailing increases in participation, loyalty and support for
the WTO project – risks undermining both the substantive commitment to the
WTO and to the DSU in particular. Given the uncertainties of the future, both
political and economic, negotiators needed certain exit options as safety valves
(including tariff re-negotiations, safeguards, broad substantive exceptions and
the possibility to settle disputes or temporarily pay compensation or suffer retaliation).53 Rather than birth defects that must be cured as soon as possible
through ever more legalization, my claim is that those exit options were, and
remain, crucial pre-conditions for trade deals to stick. Without them, the
breadth and depth of substantive WTO commitments would not have materialized. Equally, given that WTO obligations are not collective obligations binding
erga omnes partes54 settlements and non-WTO treaties in deviation of WTO rules
in other international organizations must be accepted as permissible exit strategies – where non-economic concerns complement trade liberalization – for as
long as they do not affect the rights of third parties.
At the same time, WTO contingency measures – safeguards, anti-dumping
and countervailing duties to offset subsidies – focus exclusively on harm to
competing producers. As much as, in the early days of GATT, those safety
valves were needed to attract and maintain producer support, a WTO genuinely transformed into a consumer-driven organization must have sufficient
safety valves to attract and maintain consumer support. 55
Finally, the Sutherland report’s unabated defense of the current WTO dispute settlement system neglects the threat of an over-reaching, automatic
WTO judiciary in the context of a political process that is run and continues
53
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to require consensus decision-making. It is pure wishful thinking for the
Sutherland report to say (at p 55) that
the Doha Round, it is to be profoundly hoped, will eventually correct the
imbalance between law-making and any tendency toward creative law enforcement through the dispute settlement system.

The imbalance between the WTO judiciary and its political branch is here
to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. It is simply unrealistic to expect that
in the Doha Round a WTO of 150 members would somehow provide more
specific and less ambiguous rules than the smaller and less diverse crowd of
Uruguay Round negotiators did in 1994. If anything, new WTO agreements
are destined to be even more vague than before.
Given the need to maintain the consensus rule – at least until levels of
socialization and support for the WTO project have matured – there is an
absolute need for WTO panels and the Appellate Body to be warned
against judicial activism, of the type the early European Court of Justice
engaged in.56 WTO dispute settlement is and needs to be politically sensitive.57 Sufficient membership control must be maintained and quality
checks on the personnel active in dispute settlement increased.58 Effective
use must be made of common judicial techniques that translate political
sensitivities into legal results (such as deference, judicial minimalism,
putting the burden of proving an obligation on the complainant and even
declaring a non liquet).59 Reverting to GATT-type vetoes would, as the
Sutherland report points out (at p 56), be ‘a regression’. However, legislative correction of the Appellate Body can take forms other than formal
56
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vetoes of Appellate Body rulings.60 In particular, the political control that
the DSB currently exercises over dispute settlement ought not to be underestimated. As the umbilical cord between the political and judicial branch, it is
a crucial interface and forum of contestation or voice to which both panels
and the Appellate Body are most receptive. The outcry in the DSB against
the Appellate Body’s acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in the EC – Asbestos
dispute offers a good example.61 Ever since, the Appellate Body has not
drawn information from such briefs (even if they were formally accepted)
and a number of panels even refused outright to accept amicus briefs.62
Finally, authoritative interpretations correcting dispute rulings remain a possibility and, at least on the books, require a mere three-quarters majority.63
As elaborated above, resisting the temptation of ever more legalization
(including the temptation of judicial activism and a strict rule of precedent),
and maintaining crucial exit options (such as meaningful escape clauses and
relatively weak remedies) would take some steam off the judicial branch.
This, in turn, should facilitate political consensus building and legislative
correction, and could even make three-quarters majority interpretations
digestible. Equally, more participation and contestation in WTO affairs, as
suggested earlier (more politics), should help avoid overreaching by the
Appellate Body and lay a broader basis of support for its rulings.
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